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Shelnut: Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Unseaworthiness

NOTES
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOCTRINE OF
UNSEAWORTHINESS*
The doctrine of unseaworthiness is a continually growing concept, evolving with few restrictions. From an obscure beginning in 1903 it has experienced broad expansion and redefinition within admiralty law. Today it
provides an extensive theory of redress for both seamen and longshoremen
injured or killed while in the service of the ship.
This note will briefly trace the development of the unseaworthiness doctrine and will particularly examine three areas of current development. The
United States Supreme Court recently expanded the scope of the doctrine
by allowing a general maritime right of action for wrongful death. In
addition, the Court recognized the shipowner's defense of operational negligence and thus sanctioned a major limitation on his liability. Moreover, the
lower federal courts have played a major role in expanding maritime jurisdiction. In recent years a majority of the circuits had allowed claims for unseaworthiness where the longshoreman was injured some distance from the ship
or injured by equipment not traditionally a part of the vessel. However, the
Supreme Court, again limiting the doctrine's scope, held that state law rather
than federal maritime law governs the longshoreman's suit for nonshipboard
injuries caused by a stevedore's shorebased equipment.
SCOPE AND

COVERAGE OF THE WARRANTY

OF UNSEAWORTHINESS

-

THE

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The genesis of the twentieth century development of the doctrine of
unseaworthiness is traced to the obscure but now classic dictum in The
Osceola., At its inception the doctrine was greatly restricted in scope with
little similarity to its later construction as "essentially a species of liability
without fault." 2 Initially, most lower federal courts limited liability to those
situations in which the shipowner's negligence resulted in the vessel's unseaworthiness. 3 Seamen used the doctrine for the next two decades primarily to
*EDITOR's

NoTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize

for the best student note submitted in the summer 1971 quarter.
1. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903), where Justice Brown said: "The vessel and her owner are,
both by English and American Law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen
in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order
the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship."
For an extensive discussion of the historical background preceding and leading up to
Justice Brown's proposition, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADmIRALTY 315-32
(1957); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL
L.Q. 381, 382-403 (1954). See also Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 543-45
(1960); Dixon v. United States, 219 F.2d 10, 12-15 (2d Cir. 1955).
2. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
3. E.g., Tropical Fruit S.S. Co. v. Towle, 222 F. 867 (5th Cir. 1915); Henry B. Fiske,
141 F. 188 (D. Mass. 1905).
[236]
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recover for injuries resulting from defective appurtenances.4 Not until 1922
did the Supreme Court make its first reference to the shipowner's obligation
to furnish a seaworthy vessel without consideration of the standard of ordinary
care and negligence5
The idea that unseaworthiness does not depend upon the negligence of
the shipowners or his agents was firmly established in 1944.6 In Mahnich v.
Southern S. S. Co. 7 the seaman recovered on the theory of unseaworthiness
for injuries sustained at sea when a defective support rope gave way, causing
a portion of the ship's staging to fall. Although sound rope was available, the
Court noted: "[T he staging] was unseaworthy in the sense that it was inadequate for the purpose for which it was ordinarily used, because of the defective rope with which it was rigged. Its inadequacy rendered it unseaworthy,
whether the mate's failure to observe the defect was negligent or unavoidable." s Consequently, the seaman in performing his duties did not assume
the risk of unseaworthy gear.
Perhaps the most momentous decision in the doctrine of unseaworthiness
came two years after Mahnich in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.9 The obligation of seaworthiness, traditionally owed by the shipowner to seamen, was
extended to cover a longshoreman injured while aboard the vessel. In that
case a longshoreman was injured when'a latent defect caused a shackle supporting a boom to break and fall. Establishing that the shipowner's warranty
was absolute and nondelegable, the Supreme Court stated in regard to unseaworthiness:' 0
It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to
other well known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped to
meet the hazards which performing the services imposes, the liability
is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in
character. . ...It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the
range of its humanitarian policy.
As a result, the warranty of seaworthiness was extended not only to the
seaman who performed the ship's services under immediate hire of the shipowner, but also to the longshoreman who rendered seaman's services with
the owner's consent. The rationale for the extension was that a worker

4. See M. Nomus, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES §19 (1959).
5. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922). "[The] trial court might
have told the jury that without regard to negligence the vessel was unseaworthy when she
left dock . . .and that if thus unseaworthy and one of the crew received damage as the
direct result thereof, he was entitled to recover compensatory damages." Id. at 259.
6. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). "After Mahnich no amount of
negligence on the part of the master, the officer in charge or fellow crew members was
fatal, provided only that plaintiff could find some handhold of unseaworthiness to cling
to." G. GiLMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 320.
7. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
8. Id. at 103.
9. 328 US. 85 (1946).
10. Id. at 94-95.
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"doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards"'" should be entitled to the seaman's protection, regardless of the employer. 1 2 With this
landmark decision the "floodgates of maritime personal injury litigation
were opened."' 3
After five decades of maritime personal injury litigation, the obvious
trend in general maritime law has been toward ever increasing protection of
seamen, longshoremen, and others called to work in the ship's service. The
shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel' 4 has evolved into an absolute,15 continuing, 6 and nondelegable" duty extending to all who perform
the type of work traditionally done by members of the ship's crew. 18
A NEw FEDERAL WRONGFUL DEATH "REMEDY"

FOR MARITIME TORTS

In overruling a ninety-four year old precedent, the United States Supreme
Court recently held that general maritime law will allow an action for wrongful death. This section will examine the confusion in admiralty law existing
prior to Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,19 and will note its rectifying
effects.
Historical Background
American maritime law, like the common law, did not allow a cause of
action for wrongful death unless expressly provided by statute.2 0 While the
common law rule was first explicitly stated in 1808, 21 judicial opinions had
implied its existence as early as 1607.22 It was probably derived from the

3
felony-merger doctrine that existed in England prior to the 19th century.'
24
Although some early American courts did not adopt this rule,' the Supreme

11. Id. at 99.
12. Id.
13. M. NORRIS, supra note 4, §23.
14. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
15. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85 (1946).
16. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
17. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
18. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). See also Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
19. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
20. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
21. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
22. Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607).
23. Under this rationale, the civil wrong merged with the felony, and when the felon
was executed all his property escheated to the Crown-leaving nothing to satisfy a
wrongful death claim. W. PROSSER, TORTS 920 (3d ed. 1964).
Other possible bases for the rule are: (1) the common law maxim actio personales
moritur cum persona; (2) that public policy prohibited human life being made subject to
judicial computation. For a detailed historical development of the rule see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 331-36 (5th ed. 1942); Winfield, Death as Affecting
Liability in Tort, 29 CoLuM. L. REV. 239 (1929).
24. E.g., Sullivan v. Union Pac. R.R., 23 F. Cas. 368 (No. 13,599) (C.C.D. Neb. 1874);
Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854); Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794).
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Court applied it to torts committed on land and held that "no civil action
,25
lies for an injury which results in death ....
The rule was extended to maritime torts in 1886 in The Harrisburg26

where the Court held that no remedy for wrongful death existed in general
maritime law and that courts must look to appropriate federal or state statutes
for wrongful death remedies. State wrongful death acts were first used to
avoid the harsh maritime rule,27 but since this was often a limited recourse
it was subsequently complemented by federal statutes permitting seamen and
28
other designated persons to recover damages for wrongful death.
The application of federally created wrongful death actions was limited,
however, to the specific subject matter encompassed by the particular statutes2 9
and did not contemplate a general right of action for wrongful death. The
Jones Act, for example, provided a wrongful death remedy only if the seaman's
death was caused by injuries attributable to the negligence of his employer.30
As a result, wrongful death actions arising out of fact situations not specifically
contemplated by federal law were remitted to state wrongful death law with
its inherent limitations.3 ' Thus, a remedial void existed when the state's
wrongful death statute32 did not incorporate such principles of maritime law
as unseaworthiness. On the other hand, disposition of maritime law by utilization of common law concepts engendered a mass of confusing decisions that
33
culminated in The Tungus v. Skovgaard.

Pre-Moragne Quagmire
In The Tungus v. Skovgaard34 an employee of an independent contractor,
hired to discharge cargo, was killed when he slipped and fell into a tank of

25. Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 US. 754, 756 (1878).
26. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
27. E.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398
(1907).
28. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§761-68

(1970).
29. The Jones Act, for example, limited recovery to a cause of action by a seaman
against his employer. Since the Jones Act incorporates the Federal Employer's Liability
Act (F.E.L.A.), 45 U.S.C. §51 (1970), there must also be in existence a member or members
entitled to recover under the F.E.L.A. Furthermore, the Jones Act limited the right to sue
for negligence only, 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970). The Death on the High Seas Act restricted its
death remedy for wrongful death occurring at sea more than 3 miles from shore. 46 U.S.C.
§§761-68 (1970).
30. 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970). The Jones Act incorporates the Federal Employer's Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1970), which states: "Every common carrier by railroad . . .shall be
liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative . . .for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier ..
31. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1969), construed in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
33. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
34. Id.
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heated coconut oil. The plaintiff, who alleged negligence and unseaworthiness,
predicated recovery upon New Jersey's wrongful death act. 35 The federal
district court dismissed the libel because no right of action for wrongful
death by unseaworthiness existed under general maritime law and also found
no duty to furnish the deceased with a safe place to work.3 6 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the New Jersey wrongful death
act did embrace a claim for unseaworthiness and that there was a duty owed
7
the deceased to exercise due care for his safety.3
On appeal, the pivotal issue confronting the Supreme Court was whether
the state or federal substantive law should apply if a state wrongful death
act was broad enough to encompass an action for death caused by the vessel's
unseaworthiness. The Court held that when an admiralty court adopts a state
cause of action for wrongful death it "must enforce the right as an integrated
whole, with whatever conditions and limitations the creating state has

attached." 38 Whenever the duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel is created by
state law, recovery must be predicated upon the entire state wrongful death
statute. In effect, the ruling in The Tungus required the court trying the
case to utilize the state's substantive law as well as its death remedy.
The dissent argued that the duties owed a longshoreman on board the
vessel were created by maritime law and, therefore, should be governed by
federal substantive principles. Since maritime law allows no remedy for
wrongful death occurring upon a state's navigable waters, it should utilize
the state statute that generally provides a remedy for tortious death in enforcing the federal cause of action.39
The anomaly created by The Tungus in applying substantive state law
became readily apparent. The primary determinant of recovery was whether
the injury was fatal. 40 If fatal, the survivors had to look to applicable state
law to determine recovery; 41 if nonfatal, theories under general maritime law,
such as unseaworthiness, could provide a tort remedy.42 If, for example, a
longshoreman were killed within the territorial waters of New Jersey his
survivors could recover on a claim of unseaworthiness, since New Jersey's
act incorporated substantive admiralty principles. 43 If, however, the same
longshoreman were killed as the result of the same unseaworthy condition
in Florida's territorial waters, his survivors would probably be precluded from

35. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 31-1 (1952). The Act gives a cause of action when the death
of a person is caused by "a wrongful act, neglect or default .... "
36. Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 141 F. Supp. 653 (D.N.J. 1956).
37. Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 252 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1957).
38. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1959).
39. Id. at 597-612.
40. In dissent, Justice Brennan stated: "Today the Court announces the strange principle that the substantive rules of law governing human conduct in regard to maritime
torts vary in their origin depending on whether the conduct gives rise to a fatal or a
nonfatal injury." Id. at 611.
41. Where state substantive law was applicable, recovery for wrongful death was often
dependent on such principles as contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
42. See, e.g., Graham v. Lusi, 206 F.2d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1953).
43. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 31-1 (1952).
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recovering, since the Florida statute does not contemplate the unseaworthiness
principle.
Prior to the Moragne decision, Florida stood alone among the major
maritime states in denying to the survivors of a deceased longshoreman the
benefits of general maritime substantive law, such as the warranty of seaworthiness and comparative negligence. 45 Early Florida cases interpreting
Florida's wrongful death act 4- in relation to maritime torts were decided by
lower federal courts.47 In those cases, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that, in the absence of state authority, the Florida statute did
not incorporate principles of maritime law.
Subsequently, the Florida supreme court held that contributory negligence
was a complete bar to recovery for wrongful death occurring upon the state's
navigable waters. 48 In addition, Florida's statute created in behalf of the
statutory beneficiaries a new right of action for wrongful death based on
common law principles rather than preserving the right of action, which the
deceased could have prosecuted had he lived.49 By refusing to incorporate
principles of general maritime law Florida became a primary contributor to
the contradictory decisions and often anomalous results engendered by
The Tungus.
Inconsistencies were not confined to the nonstatutory aspects of maritime
law, but also resulted from the piecemeal federal legislation in the area. In
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,6 9 the Jones Act was construed to provide an exclusive right of action for death of a "seaman" killed in the scope
of his employment, and recovery was based on proof of the employer's negligence. The Act precluded recovery predicated on a state wrongful death act,
although the state act recognized unseaworthiness as a basis for recovery.
Absent negligence, the Jones Act provided no remedy for wrongful death.5 '
44. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161, 167 (Fla. 1968).
45. After The Tungus decision, the following states interpreted their death acts to
incorporate admiralty substantive law: (California) Curry v. Fred Olsen Lines, 367 F.2d
921 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967); (Louisiana) Grigsby v. Coastal Marine
Serv., 235 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1964), aff'd, 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969); (Maryland)
Smith v. The Nabella, 176 F. Supp. 668 (D. Md. 1959); (Michigan) Hunter v. Dampsk A/S
Flint, 279 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Mich. 1967); (New Jersey) United N.J. & N.J. Sandy Hook
Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); (New York) Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen,
333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964); (Oregon) Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); (South
Carolina) Antony v. International Paper Co., 289 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1961); (Texas) Vassallo
v. Neder/-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 344 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. 1961); (Virginia) Holley
v. The Manfred Stansfield, 269 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1959); (West Virginia) Goett v. Union
Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960).
46. FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1969).
47. E.g., Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prod. Co., 282 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1960); Graham
v. Lusi, 206 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953).
48. Bilbrey v. Weed, 215 So. 2d 479 (1968). This holding was totally contrary to
admiralty principles of comparative negligence.
49. E.g., Morgane v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla. 1968); Florida E.
Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
50. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
51. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Turcich v. Liberty Corp., 217 F.2d
495 (3d Cir. 1954); Kunschman v. United States, 54 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1932).
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For nonfatal accidents occurring prior to Moragne, the nonseaman who
performed work in the ship's service could recover under maritime law for
injuries caused by unseaworthiness.62 The injured seaman could maintain an
action against the shipowner predicated upon either negligence under the
Jones Act or upon the general maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness. In fatal
injuries arising on the high seas, the Death on the High Seas Act5 3 provided
the representatives of seamen and longshoremen a remedy for negligence or
nseaworthiness5 4 However, the representatives of a nonseaman killed within
territorial waters could seek recovery based on the state's wrongful death act
only if maritime principles were incorporated.55 Moreover, the deceased
seaman's survivors were limited to recovery under the Jones Act for negligently-caused death within the state's waters. 6 Consequently, recovery became
largely fortuitous, depending upon three variables: the identity of the victim;
the location of the accident; and the fatal or nonfatal nature of the injury.
An Action for Wrongful Death Within GeneralMaritime Law
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.5 7 the United States Supreme
Court created a maritime cause of action for tortious death on state territorial waters. Plaintiff's husband, a longshoreman, had been killed by a
falling hatch beam while working aboard a vessel on navigable waters in
Florida. The plaintiff sued the vessel's owner under Florida's Wrongful
Death Act58 and survival statute59 on claims of negligence and unseaworthiness. The district court dismissed the claim of unseaworthiness under Florida's
statute.6 0 On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
certified a question to the Florida supreme court as to whether the Florida
wrongful death act incorporated substantive maritime principles. 61 The
Florida court found that the statute did not incorporate substantive admiralty principles and, therefore, did not encompass a cause of action for
unseaworthiness.62 On certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed

52. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
53. 46 U.S.C. §761 (1970).
54. Kerman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958).
55. Compare The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), with Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
56. Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., said: "Only
the family survivors of a seaman are left without a remedy for his death within territorial waters caused by failure to maintain a seaworthy vessel. Only they are denied recourse to this rule of absolute liability and relegated to proof of negligence under the
Jones Act." 379 U.S. 148, 159 (1964).
57. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).

58.
59.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§768.01 (1969).
§46.021 (1969).

60. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. Id. See also FLA. STAT. §25.031 (1969); FLA. Apr. R. 4.61; Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification: A Reexamination To Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U.
F.A. L. REv. 21 (1969).
62. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
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and held that an action lies under federal maritime law for death caused by
3
violations of maritime duties6
The immediate effects of this landmark decision are threefold. First, a
federal cause of action for wrongful death is created, thus providing a remedy
regardless of where the tort occurs. Now, conduct of the shipowner that
breaches his warranty of seaworthiness will produce liability not only when
the victim is injured but also when he is killed.- While an unseaworthy
condition resulted in liability for death occurring outside the state's territorial waters prior to the instant case,65 the same condition will now create
liability within the state's territorial waters. Moreover, the survivors of both
seamen and longshoremen fatally injured on the state's territorial waters now
have a right of action for wrongful death under the general maritime doctrine
of unseaworthiness. 6
It also appears that the seaman's right to a claim of unseaworthiness
under general maritime law is in addition to claims under the Jones Act 67 or
a claim based on the Death on the High Seas Act. 68 The Supreme Court, in
dictum, indicated that the new federal remedy "seemed to be beyond the
preclusive effect of the Jones Act as interpreted in Gillespie."69 In deciding
that the Jones Act supersedes the application of a state wrongful death statute,
neither Gillespie-° nor its predecessor, Lindgren v. United States, 1 discussed
the effect of the Jones Act on other federal remedies.
Second, greater uniformity in admiralty tort actions now appears to have
been achieved under general maritime law. The Moragne court stated:72
Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under
general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies,
removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the
necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime
substantive concepts.
This decision reaffirms the constitutional principle that federal admiralty law
must be "a system of law co-extensive with, and operating uniformly in, the
whole country."13 Previously this objective could not be achieved, since The
Harrisburg invited conflicting decisions- 4 by requiring reliance upon state

63. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).
64. This corrects the inequity created by both The Harrisburgand The Tungus.
65. See Kerman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
66. The Moragne case dealt specifically with the wrongful death of a longshoreman;
but the new right of action created by the Supreme Court is broad enough to encompasg
longshoremen and seamen alike. See Epling v. M.T. Epling Co., 435 F.2d 732, 736 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971).
67. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
68. Kerman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
69. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396 n.12 (1970).
70. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
71. 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
72. 398 US. 375, 401 (1970).
73. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1875).
74. E.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Moragne v. States Marine
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wrongful death statutes. However, Moragne now provides a federal right of
action for the breach of a federally created duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel,
and therefore it no longer depends on the vagaries of state law. The policy that the federal nature of admiralty law and the unique risks inherent in
traveling and working upon state territorial waters requires a uniform law has now been fully implemented.
Finally, by placing the burden upon the shipowner who has the advantage
of distributing the loss over the industry,75 the new right of action will provide
relief from economic loss, which otherwise might have been sustained by the
maritime worker and his dependents.7 6 The growth of insurance and the
highly subsidized nature of the shipping industry seem to buttress the proposition that it is more able to bear the risk than the individual seaman or
77
longshoreman.
Unanswered Questions
Although a federal right of action now exists, questions concerning
its implementation, vital to future litigation, remain unanswered. The
Moragne court suggested that personal injury cases and analogous federal
maritime statutes would provide possible guidelines in solving such problems
as the proper limitation period, possible defenses, the determination of
7T
beneficiaries, and the amount of damages.
Limitation Period. While there is no federal statute of limitation for
actions of unseaworthiness, the rule of laches has been applied in admiralty
law to other maritime causes of action.79 Since the bar to wrongful death
actions has been removed from general maritime law, the equitable doctrine
of laches appears to be the proper measure for determining inexcusable
delay. Future courts may consider as possible guidelines the one-, two-, or
three-year statutes of limitation as provided by three federal maritime statutes.80 In addition, there is authority for applying a three-year limitation

Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
75. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
76. Note, Judicial Expansion of Remedies for Wrongful Death in Admiralty: A Proposal, 49 B.U.L. REv. 114, 143 (1969). It should be noted that the survivors of the deceased
longshoreman may recover from this general maritime action, as well as the remedy under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1970). In
maritime personal injury cases, the Supreme Court has apparently sanctioned such double
recovery, since it allowed the circumvention of the exclusive nature of the statutory remedy.
See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
77. See Note, supra note 76, at 139-40; cf. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,
386 U.S. 724 (1967).
78. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 407 (1970).
79. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958). See 2 M. Noiuus, THE
LAW OF SEAmEN §633 (3d ed. 1970).
80. Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §909 (1970) (one
year); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §763 (1970) (two years); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§688 (1970) (three years).
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period in deciding untimeliness.81
Perhaps the two-year limitation of the Death on the High Seas Act should
be the most persuasive standard in determining the measure of laches. The
Act is not only broader in scope than other federal legislation, but also is
not limited to a specific class of victims as are other statutes. s2 Additionally,
it is the only statute that applied specifically and exclusively to the right to
bring a wrongful death action.
Defenses. Since the right created in Moragne is uniquely maritime in
nature, all defenses available under the doctrine of unseaworthiness in personal injury cases should be applicable to the wrongful death action. Admiralty law has traditionally followed the more flexible rule of comparative
negligence, which allows consideration of contributory negligence only in
mitigation of damages.8 3 The decedent's contributory negligence, however,
will bar an action if it is the sole cause of the injury.84 After Moragne the
Fifth Circuit reversed a lower court's decision barring an action because of
contributory negligence and applied the traditional admiralty comparative
negligence standards 5 If the vessel is seaworthy and the accident is caused
solely by the negligence of the seaman or longshoreman, such negligence at
the moment of the accident does not render the vessel unseaworthy; therefore, the decedent's representative is not entitled to recover from the shipowner for such negligence8 6
The shipowner should also be precluded from avoiding liability for
wrongful death due to an unseaworthy condition on the ground that the
decedent assumed the risk of his employment. As with contributory negligence,
the common law defense of assumption of risk has traditionally been unavailable as a bar to an unseaworthiness claim.87 Therefore, the implementation
of maritime rules with respect to comparative negligence and assumption of
risk now appear to be dearly applicable in maritime wrongful death actions
as they are in other causes of action based upon unseaworthiness.
Schedule of Beneficiaries. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in implementing
the new remedy will be in the determination of beneficiaries. Schedules vary
considerably among both the federal maritime statutes and the state sta-

81. Flowers v. Savannah Mach. 8, Foundry Co., 310 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1962) (The Jones
Act three-year period was used by analogy).
82. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§761-68 (1970).
83. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1
(1890).
84. 2 M. NoRRis, supra note 79, §630. Cf. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Newman, 243 F.2d
804 (6th Cir. 1957); Mason v. Lynch Bros. Co., 228 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1956).
85. Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970).
86. For a discussion of the defense of operational negligence see text accompanying
notes 116-208 infra.
87. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). See also 2 M. NoRns, supra note
79, §623.
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tutes. 88 Although it is conceivable that relevant state law may be considered,
this seems unlikely as the maritime duties that have been abrogated are
entirely federal. In fact, a preference for congressional determination of the
manner of implementation has been indicated.8 9
Congressional intent may be discerned from three federal maritime
statutes. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act predicates recovery upon a compromise or quid pro quo basis, characteristic of
workmen's compensation acts. 90 In return for the relinquishment of certain
common law defenses the survivor's recovery is limited to a scheduled loss in
the event of death. This provision does not conform to general maritime
principles of recovery 9 and seems, therefore, inapplicable.
Similarly, the Jones Act appears to be an inappropriate guideline since
it incorporates a remedial system foreign to admiralty law. 9 2 Moreover, its
scope is limited to seamen's claims against their employers, and recovery is
based upon violations of a specific standard of negligence. 9' In determining
beneficiaries the Act provides for a mutually exclusive class. 94 Under this
Act a class of beneficiaries, rather than the decedent's estate, is named. 95 If
the seaman leaves no survivor in any of the designated classes, his personal
representative is precluded from recovery for his death.9 6 A dependent
relative, for example, can be barred by a prior class of nondependent relatives
who have suffered no pecuniary loss.9r These and other limitations diminish
its likelihood as a guideline.

88. Compare FLA. STAT. §768.02 (1969), with N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:31-2 (1952).
89. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408-09 (1970) (argument
of United States as amicus curiae, which was noted by Justice Harlan in the majority
opinion).
90. 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1970). See M. NoRuis, MARIME PERSONAL INJURIES §132 (1959).
91. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408 (1970). For a discussion
of the determination of compensation paid when injuries cause death see M. Nogaus, supra
note 90, §177.
92. Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1970); the Jones Act incorporates
by reference the F.E.L.A., which provides for liability of railroads to their employees. See
Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 40 (1930); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375
(1924).
93. 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970). Recovery for negligence is foreign to the general maritime
principles of unseaworthiness, which is predicated upon a species of liability without fault.
94. 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970). The classes of beneficiaries are as follows: (a) the surviving
widow or husband and children of the deceased; (b) if there is no widow or husband
and children of the employee surviving, then to the employee's parents; and (c) if there
are no survivors of the first classes, then to the next of kin dependent upon the employee.
95. See The Pan Two, 26 F. Supp. 990, 992 (D. Md. 1939).
96. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1930); Beebe v. Moormack Gulf Lines,
Inc., 59 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 597 (1932).
97. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Blidberg-Rothschild Co., 195 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,
296 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1961) (a nondependent daughter prevented a dependent mother
from recovering); The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1947) (pecuniary losses to
decedent's sister were not cognizable when father was alive). See also Poff v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 150 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 327 U.S. 399 (1946).
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The federal maritime statute that appears most amenable to the principles
of unseaworthiness, and favored by the Moragne court 8 in the determination
of beneficiaries, is the Death on the High Seas Act.9 9 The Act is of general
application and deals exclusively with actions for wrongful death. It is the
only maritime statute that applies to any "person" rather than to one specific
class of maritime workers 00 and bases liability on conduct violative of general
maritime law.
The Death on the High Seas Act provides that the personal representatives
may bring a claim "for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband,
parent, child or dependent relative."''1 1 In effect, the shortcomings of the
Jones Act 1 02 are obviated by the apportionment of damages among the possible beneficiaries. The United States, as amicus curiae in Moragne, argued
that borrowing its schedule of beneficiaries would not only effectuate the
expressed congressional preference in the area, but would also promote
uniformity by ensuring that the beneficiaries would be the same for identical
03
torts, rather than varying with the employment status of the decedent.
Survival of Actions. Although the Moragne court made no mention of
the survival of the decedent's claim for personal injuries sustained prior to
his death, such a result seems consistent with the Court's broad protection
of the decedent's survivors. This also appears to be supported by judicial
decisions interpreting the federal maritime statutes. While the Death on the
High Seas Act does not explicitly provide for the survival of actions, °" it
has been supplemented by state survival statutes. 05 Likewise, the Jones Act
has been interpreted to preserve a claim for pain and suffering where death
results from the employer's negligence. ° 6
Damages. In regard to the measure of damages, the Moragne court suggested that both the Death on the High Seas Act and the numerous state

98. See 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
99. 46 U.S.C. §761 (1970).
100. The Jones Act applies exclusively to seamen, while, as the name indicates, the

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is totally for the benefit of
longshoremen and harbor workers.
101. 46 U.S.C. §761 (1970).
102. 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970).
103. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 898 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).
104. 46 U.S.C. §§761, 762 (1970). See Decker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 91 F.
Supp. 560 (D). Mass. 1950). But see Tetterton v. Arctic Tankers, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 429
(E.D. Pa. 1953).
105. See, e.g., Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Petition
of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). But see Decker v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 560 (D. Mass. 1950).
106. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 157 (1964). The Court found

that the Jones Act through §9 of the F.E.L.A., 45 U.SC. §59 (1970), provided for the
survival of actions.
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wrongful death acts should be persuasive guidelines for future litigation. 0 7
08
it is
However, since state laws vary in the determination of damages,
not
lend
would
doubtful that state law will be considered; its application
uniformity as required by Moragne. In a case decided after Moragne, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated: 0 9
Recognition of a right of recovery for wrongful death under the
general maritime law strongly dictates that in order to promote uniformity and supremacy of maritime law, the measure of recovery must
be governed by the principles of that law where .

.

. there is a conflict

between damages recoverable under the general maritime law and
those recoverable under state law.
Since recovery under the Death on the High Seas Act" 0 and the Jones
Act - is limited to pecuniary loss, it appears that general maritime law
should likewise be limited in ascertaining loss sustained by death. The amount
of recovery then should reflect deprivation of the reasonable expectation of
pecuniary benefits that would have resulted from the continued life of the
deceased." 2 Where loss to survivors is the measure, the primary elements of
pecuniary loss, such as the loss of the decedent's earning capacity and the
value of his personal service and attention to the members of his family,
should be included. 13 General maritime law, on the other hand, does not
recognize awards for loss of consortium"- or for loss of the decedent's counsel,
care, and guidance."15

107. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408 (1970).
108. For example, Florida law does not limit the amount of recovery for a wrongful
death action, while Massachusetts limits recovery to $50,000. See MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch.
229, §2 (1955).
109. Petition of United States Steel Corp. v. Lamp, 436 F.2d 1256, 1279 (6th Cir. 1970)
(citations omitted).
110. 46 U.S.C. §761 (1970).
111. 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970). While the F.E.L.A., 45 U.S.C. §51 (1970), merely allows recovery of damages for the benefit of surviving relatives without prescribing the measure, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the damages under this Act "are such as flow from
the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might have reasonably
received if the deceased had not died from his injuries." Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland,
227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913).
112. See Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622, 624 (6th Cir. 1948).
113. On remand of the Moragne case, the federal district court suggested the consideration of the following elements of damages in its jury instructions: (1) the reasonable
expense of funeral and burial services of the decedent; (2) the loss of the decedent's support for his wife and minor children; (3) the wife's loss, by reason of her husband's death,
of his services, comfort, protection, and society; (4) the loss to each minor child, prior to
his attaining the age of 21 years, of his father's attention, education, nurture, and moral
training. Jury Instructions on file with the University of Florida Law Review.
114. E.g., Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964); Simpson v. Knutsen O.A.S., 296 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1969);
Valitutto v. D/S I/D Garonne, 295 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Jury Instructions, supra note 113.
115. See Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1276-79 (6th Cir. 1970).
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OPERATIONAL NEGLIGENCE -

A DEFENSE FOR UNSEANVORTHINESS CLAIv

Another significant development in the doctrine of unseaworthiness has
been the Supreme Court's sanction of the defense of operational negligence,
a major limitation of the shipowner's liability.
Under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, the shipowner has a duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, equipment, and crew. 1 6 This warranty extends to
all men who perform work in the ship's service,' whether injured on board
the ship or on the pier.1 18 The shipowner may be liable for injuries resulting
from the ship's defective equipment" 9 and personnel,120 as well as defective
cargo containers,' 21 improperly stowed cargo, 22 and defective equipment
23
owned and controlled by the stevedoring company.
While the duty owed by the shipowner is absolute 2 4 and nondelegable' 25
he is not required to furnish an accident-free vessel, but one that is reasonably
fit for its intended use. 26 In other words, the absolute duty is merely to provide a vessel and appurtenances reasonably safe for their intended purposes
27
and reasonably adequate for the place and occasion directed by the owner.
Thus, since the shipowner is not an insurer against all accidents occurring
aboard the vessel, the question arises as to what type of injury-causing circumstances are within the scope of the shipowner's liability.
Pre-Mascuilli Situation
A well-settled principle of maritime law is that liability for unseaworthiness is a species of liability without fault' 28 and is completely distinct and

separate from the concept of negligence. 29 Prior to Usner v. Luckenbach
Overseas Corp.120 the Supreme Court had held that the negligence of a longshoreman could create a condition of unseaworthiness.' 5 ' The Court had not
decided until that case, however, whether operational negligence of a mar116. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
117. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
118. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
119. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
120. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
121. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962). See
also Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
122. Rich v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 278 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1960).
123. Alaska S.S. Co., Inc. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
124. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,
362 U.S. 539 (1960).
125. Alaska S.S. Co., Inc. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
126. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960). "The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness ....
Id. at 550.
127. See Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
128. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1946).
129. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). For a discussion of the
difficulty in separating the two concepts, see Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d
193, 197 n.6 (5th Cir. 1967).
130. 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
131. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
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time worker was synonymous with unseaworthiness. Thus, the lower federal
courts assumed the task of determining the proper scope and function of the
concept of operational negligence. Considerable conflict and varying interpretations resulted among the federal judicial circuits.
The Second Circuit in Grillea v. United States"32 was first to define the
relationship betweeen unseaworthiness and a negligent act. There, the wrong
hatch cover was placed over a pad eye' 33 only a short time before it gave way
when a longshoreman stepped on it. In determining that the negligent act
had terminated and the unseaworthy condition had commenced, Judge
Learned Hand found it necessary, although at times difficult, to separate
the situations where "the defect is only an incident in a continuous operation
and those in which some intermediate step is to be taken .. . ."'- While not
every negligent act would render the shipowner liable for unseaworthiness,
liability would be imposed where an unsafe condition existed. The court
concluded that sufficient time had elapsed between the negligent act and
the injury to sustain liability. 13 5 Thus, the Second Circuit embraced the
proposition that unseaworthiness did not result from an isolated act of negligence,13 6 but rather from an act incidental to a continuous course of operation.137
The central issue became whether the injury occurred simultaneously
with the negligent act or occurred after the act terminated - creating an
unseaworthy condition. Time became a crucial factor in determining the
precise point of unseaworthiness and, therefore, liability to the shipowner.
To impose liability the condition must have existed for a time prior to the
accident, 38 and an interval of time, however momentary, 1 39 must have elapsed
between the act and the point of injury. In other words, two separate acts
rather than one are required to create an unseaworthy condition.- ° However,
the momentary time interval need not be of sufficient length to give the shipowner notice.141
As one commentator has aptly stated: "The distinction was easy to state,
difficult to define, and, as the courts promptly realized, almost impossible
132. 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
133. A plate or casting with an eye normal to its surface and formed solid with the
plate. R. DEKERCHONE, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DITIONARY 270, 563 (2d ed. 1961).
134. Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1956).
135. Id.
136. Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
840 (1962). There, no condition of unseaworthiness existed where the finding that the sole
cause of the boom buckling during the loading of cargo was negligence by the longshoreman.
137. In Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., Judge Hays illustrated this relationship:
"A ship is not unseaworthy because it has glass in a window which might be broken.
The injuries of a seaman who negligently breaks such a glass are not the result of unseaworthiness, nor are the injuries of a seaman who is cut by the falling glass. But injury
incurred in stepping on the broken glass does result from unseaworthiness." Id. at 757 (concurring opinion).
138. See Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958).
139. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
140. Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962).
141. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
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to apply with logical consistency."' 4 2 The reality of this statement can be
illustrated by an example from the Ninth Circuit. In Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp. 43 a longshoreman received injuries when a ladder he was descending slipped. When the ladder was to be in use only a short time the
custom and practice was to have one of the group hold the ladder, rather
than to latch it to the deck. On this occasion, however, neither of the plaintiff's co-workers secured the ladder, which was otherwise sound and fit for its
intended use. The district court found that the proximate cause of the injury
was the negligent act of the plaintiff's co-workers in the use of the seaworthy
appliance; thus, no unseaworthy condition was created, as the negligent act
had not terminated. 44 The court of appeals reversed and held that the
ladder did not fall because of the negligent way in which his co-workers held
the ladder at the moment of injury. 4 5 Instead, their negligence in failing to
act prior to the accident had ended before the ladder fell and, therefore, was
an antecedent condition in causing the ladder to become unseaworthy. 14
This case appropriately demonstrates the ostensible simplicity of the rule and
the difficult and possible inconsistency of its application.
Prior to Mascuilli v. United States47 in 1967, the majority of circuits
followed the rule that no liability predicated on unseaworthiness resulted
where the injury was sustained simultaneously with the negligent use of seaworthy equipment. Liability attached only if the negligent act had come to
rest and the resulting condition was preexisting. However, the Third and
Fourth Circuits followed a minority position that apparently rejected any
distinction between the act and the condition. 48
In Arena v. Luckenbach S. S. Co.' 49 the First Circuit refused to equate
unseaworthiness with mere negligent conduct. In that case no unseaworthiness was found when a roll of paper, improperly loaded by the longshoreman,
fell and injured him. "The [vessel] was not defective," the court noted,
"simply because the longshoremen who loaded it neglected to do so in the
proper fashion."'150 The Second Circuit continued to recognize the actcondition distinction first discussed in Grillea v. United States.'5 '

142. Zobel, The Unseaworthy Instant, 45 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 200, 209 (1970).
143. 336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964).
144. Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 224 F. Supp. 814, 815 (D. Ore. 1963).
145. Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1964).
146. Id.
147. 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
148. Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913
(1964); Ferrante v. Swedish Am. Lines, 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 801
(1964); Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964).
149. 279 F.2d 186 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960).
150. Id. at 188.
151. 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956). See text accompanying notes 132-137 supra. See also
Fenton v. A/S Glittre, 370 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 944 (1967);
Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966); Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
360 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1966); Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 355 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1966);
Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1965); Guarracino v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 333 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), "ert. denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964); Spinelli v.
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The Fifth Circuit, as well as the Ninth Circuit, 152 adopted the momentary
time theory as the primary determinant of liability. Its first decision in the
special area of operational negligence was Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores,
Inc.153 The plaintiff, a longshoreman, was loading cargo in the hold of the
ship. Unable to see his fellow longshoreman, the winch operator lowered the
load, pinning the plaintiff against the bulkhead. Finding no defective equipment aboard the vessel and no functional failure of any equipment, the district court concluded that the cause of the accident was the concurrent negligence of the injured longshoreman and his co-workers.54
On appeal, the decision in favor of the shipowner was upheld upon the
basis that the operational negligence of a co-worker at the "moment of
injury" does not render a vessel unseaworthy.155 On the other hand, the
court noted in a companion case that the improper use of seaworthy equipment by an intermediate employee will render the ship unseaworthy if the
injury occurred after the negligent act has terminated and the equipment has
been left in an unsafe condition. 56
Mascuilli v. United States and Its Effect
In 1967 the Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to settle
the existing confusion over the applicability of the defense of operational
negligence. However, its brief opinion in Mascuilli v. United States'57 enIsthmian S.S. Co., 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964); Puddu v. Royal
Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 871 U.S. 840 (1962).
152. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Garcia, 378 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1967); Blassingill v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964); Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108 (9th
Cir. 1964); Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Billeci v. United
States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962); Morrell v. United States, 297 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 960 (1962); Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958).
153. 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 869 (1967).
154. Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 290, 291 (W.D. La. 1965).
155. Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1967).
156. Robichaux v. Kerr McGee Oil Indus., Inc., 376 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1967). In
Dugas v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 378 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967),
the minute intricacies of the momentary time theory were cogently illustrated. In that case
a hookup man, a fellow longshoreman with the plaintiff, violated the safety regulations
when he used one sling rather than the required two to load and secure some dunnage
boards. As the second load was being loaded several pieces of dunnage came loose and
struck the longshoreman on the back. The board that struck the plaintiff slid from the
load just as it was being lifted. The plaintiff contended that the negligence of the hookup
man created an unseaworthy condition, at least during the 10-15 seconds that elapsed
between the time the sling encircling the load was hooked to the gantry line and the time
the crane started to raise the load. Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals said:
"So long as the load stayed at rest on the dock, there was no unsafe condition. It was
only after the crane started to raise the load that it became dangerous and then there was
a momentary interval of time before the dunnage fell and struck the plaintiff." Id. at
273-74. Even assuming that the unsafe condition preexisted for the 10-15 seconds, the
shipowner incurred no liability as he was under no duty to guard against the "isolated
and completely unforeseeable" event, nor did that event prove the vessel not to be
reasonably fit for her intended service. See Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 1675 (1962).
157. 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
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gendered an even greater morass of conflict among the lower federal courts. 15s
In Mascuilli a libel was filed against the United States for the death of
a longshoreman killed while loading a government vessel. The accident
occurred when a heavy shackle, under opposing pressure of two winches,
parted, recoiled, and struck the victim. The district court found his death was
caused solely by the negligence of the victim's fellow longshoreman who permitted the ropes to become taut, causing the shackle to part and recoil. 59
The shackle was found to be within design specifications and seaworthy at
all times prior to the fatal accident. 1 0 The court of appeals accordingly
affirmed the judgment in favor of the shipowner.1' 1
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court summarily reversed, citing two
cases.62 Although the lower courts had found operational negligence to be
the sole cause of the fatal incident and thus denied the claim, the Supreme
Court made no mention of the concept. As a result, the status of the concept
as a complete bar to a claim of unseaworthiness became uncertain.
In attempting to find the correct meaning of the cryptic decision, various
interpretations of Mascuilli followed. The Second Circuit refused to continue
following Grillea and interpreted Mascuilli as eliminating the time-lapse
criteria as a requisite for determining unseawortbiness.163 In essence, the
circuit committed itself to the proposition that operational negligence must
be equated with unseaworthiness.164 Since Mascuilli's accident occurred instantaneously, the Second Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court found
unseaworthiness in a soundly constructed and properly equipped vessel merely
5
because of the negligence of the longshoremen engaged in the operation.16
The Fourth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, held that operational negligence was subsumed under the unseaworthiness doctrine and thereby rejected
it as a defense to liability.166 This initial post-Mascuilli interpretation was
later clouded when the Fourth Circuit stated: "We adhere to the view that
operational negligence may cause unseaworthiness, but do not intimate that

158. Compare Tarabocchia v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 417 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1969),
vacated, 401 U.S. 950 (1971), with Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv., Inc., 412 F.2d 1011 (5th
Cir. 1969) and Tim v. American President Lines, Ltd., 409 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1969).
159. Mascuilli v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 562, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
160. Id. at 560, 562.
161. Mascuilli v. United States, 358 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1966).
162. The Supreme Court decided Mascuilli in the following brief opinion: "The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 . . . Crumady v. Joachim Henrik Fisser, S58 U.S. 423 .......
387
U.S. 737 (1967).
163. Tarabocchia v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 417 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1969),
vacated, 401 U.S. 930 (1971); Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d
Cir. 1967); Alexander v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 382 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1967).
164. Tarabocchia v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 417 F.2d 476, 478 (2d Cir. 1969), vacated,
401 U.S. 930 (1971).
165. See Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967).
166. Lundy v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1970); Venable v. A/S Det
Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1968).
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every instance of operational negligence necessarily creates liability under the
unseaworthiness doctrine."167
Prior to Mascuilli the Fifth Circuit had categorically rejected the notion
of "instant unseaworthiness."168 Finding it unlikely that the Supreme Court

would have attempted to eliminate the conflict among the circuits by such
an "unilluminating pronouncement," the court declined to change its policy.' 69
Furthermore, upon analysis of the cases cited by the Mascuilli court, the
Fifth Circuit failed to find the anticipated sweeping purpose that would
require equating operational negligence with unseaworthiness.170 Thus, the
circuit, following its earlier pronouncements, insisted that there must be an
unseaworthy condition creating liability rather than instantaneous injury
occasioned by an act.171
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Mascuilli was decided on the asserted
factual similarity with Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser' 2 and, therefore, did not reach the question of "instant unseaworthiness."''l 7 It was the
court's belief that the Supreme Court answered on its reversal only the first
of three questions presented by the plaintiff in Mascuilli, excluding the issue
of "instant unseaworthiness.174
Other possible interpretations of Mascuilli were given by various federal
courts. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
for example, maintained that the Supreme Court did not eliminate completely the act-condition dichotomy, but rather extended unseaworthiness to
its greatest possible limit. 175 Consequently, unseaworthiness would be pre-

sumed whenever a question was presented of whether a condition caused the
maritime worker's injury.176 Such a presumption, the court maintained, would
not only preserve the dichotomy, but would also be consistent with the expansive trend in the unseaworthiness doctrine.177

Prior to Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas

Corp.178

the conflict among the

167. Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347, 355 (4th Cir.

1968).
168. See text accompanying notes 152-56 supra.
169. Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv., Inc., 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Dillon
v. M.S. Oriental Inventor, 426 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1970); Reed v. MV Foylebank, 415 F.2d
838 (5th Cir. 1969); Duncan v. Transeastern Shipping Corp., 413 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1969).
170. Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv., Inc., 412 F.2d 1011, 1033 (5th Cir. 1969).
171. Id. at 1032.
172. 387 U.S. 237 (1967). See note 162 and accompanying text supra.
173. See Tim v. American President Lines, Ltd., 409 F.2d 385, 391 (9th Cir. 1969).
174. The three questions presented by the petition were: " (1) Did a prior unseaworthy condition come into play by the tightline condition? (2) Did the negligent handling
of proper equipment by the longshoremen create a dangerous condition rendering the
vessel unseaworthy? (3) Was the vessel unseaworthy because the longshoremen were not
equal in disposition and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling, as was found in
Boudoin v. Lykes Bros, S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955)?" Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
2, Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U.S. 237 (1967).

175.
176.
177.
178.

Jackson v. S. S. Kings Point, 276 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. La. 1967).
Id. at 453.
Id.
400 U.S. 494 (1971).
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circuits that had considered the question of operational negligence can be
summarized as follows: 1 7 9 (1) The Second, Third,180 and Fourth Circuits
committed themselves to the proposition that a single act of negligence causing injury would render the vessel unseaworthy; (2) The Fifth and Ninth
Circuits rejected the theory of 'instant unseaworthiness" and embraced the
concept of operational negligence as a complete bar to recovery against the
shipowner.
OperationalNegligence Recognized by Supreme Court
Following Mascuilli four years of confusion in the lower federal courts
8 1
elapsed before the Supreme Court, in Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp.,2
held that no condition of unseaworthiness existed for a third party's single
and wholly unforeseeable act of negligence. The impact of the decision, in
essence, is that the shipowner has a defense that prevents him from being
an absolute insurer for all injuries suffered by the maritime worker in the
ship's service.
In Usner the plaintiff was a longshoreman employed by an independent
contractor. Engaged with others in loading steel rods onto the vessel, he was
to secure the rods by affixing a sling each time the cargo was lowered from
the ship's boom. This procedure was carried on for some time, until the winch
operator lowered the sling just out of the plaintiff's reach. After motioning to
the flagman to have the sling lowered further, the plaintiff was struck and
injured when the winch operator lowered the fail "too far and too fast."' 82
The vessel's equipment was sound and in good condition both before and
after the accident. Plaintiff brought an action for damages, alleging that his
injury had been caused by the ship's unseaworthiness.
On an interlocutory appeal from denial of the shipowner's motion for a
summary judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and
granted the summary judgment holding that operational negligence at the
moment of injury did not render the vessel unseaworthy.18 3 Consistent with
its prior decisions interpreting Mascuilli v. United States,8 4 the appellate
court noted: "'instant unseaworthiness' resulting from 'operational negligence'
of the stevedoring contractor is not a basis for recovery by an injured longshoreman."'' 8 5 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed and found the
86
shipowner 'not liable for the unseaworthiness of his vessel.
The basis of the decision in Usner was predicated upon the nature and
proper scope of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The Court ruled that unsea-

179. The other federal judicial circuits have not had litigation in this area.
180.
Ferrante
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

The Third Circuit rejected the act-condition distinction prior to Mascuilli. See
v. Swedish Am. Lines, 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1964).
400 U.S. 494 (1971).
Id. at 495.
Luckenbach Overseas Corp. v. Usner, 413 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1969).
See text accompanying notes 152-56 supra.
Luckenbach Overseas Corp. v. Usner, 413 F.2d 984, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1969).
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
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worthiness is a condition8 7 that precludes the vessel from being fit for her
intended use. This, for example, might arise from a defective portion of the
ship itself, 88 defective gear, 8 9 appurtenances in disrepair, 190 or an unfit
crew.' 9' In addition, an inadequate number of men performing a task aboard
the vessel,' 92 an improper method of loading her cargo,' 93 or improper
stowage 94 can create a condition that breaches the shipowner's warranty of
seaworthiness. The Court noted that unseaworthiness by its nature is a wholly
distinct remedy against the shipowner.' 9Once the unseaworthy condition commences, its activating force, whether
negligence 96 or not, 97 is irrelevant in determining the shipowner's liability. 98 The basic determinant of unseaworthiness is whether a condition
exists. To contend that operational negligence is itself unseaworthiness is to
erroneously substitute the causal agent for the result. Furthermore, to equate
a negligent act with unseaworthiness is contrary to the rule that the two
concepts are entirely separate and distinct. 199 The Court stated: "To hold
that [an] individual act of negligence renders the ship unseaworthy would
be to subvert the fundamental distinction between unseaworthiness and negligence .... ...- 0
Although the Court sustained the shipowner's defense of operational
negligence, its decision did not formulate practical guidelines that the lower
courts can utilize in distinguishing the act-condition dichotomy. From a prac20
tical point of view, this act-condition distinction is often difficult to draw. '
The factfinder is confronted with such questions as: When does the "operation" commence? How momentary is a momentary interval?2°2 How long is
"preexistence"? 2° 3 Did the negligent act terminate and the unseaworthy
condition begin?204 Inevitable hairline distinctions are certain to result when

187. Id. at 498.
188. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
189. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
190. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
191. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
192. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967).
193. Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
194. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 869 U.S. 355 (1962).
195. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 498 (1971).
196. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
197. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
198. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 498 (1971).
199. In discussing the relationship between the two concepts, the Court said: "What
has evolved . . . is the complete divorcement of unseaworthiness liability from concepts
of negligence." Id. at 499.
200. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971).
201. See Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966).
202. See Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 869 (1967). See also Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 F.2d 444, 448
(2d Cir. 1967).
203. Cf. Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958).
204. One judge notes: "I have great difficulty imagining any act of 'operational' negli-
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attempting to determine the exact moment when the operational act ends
205
and the unseaworthy condition commences.
On the other hand, perhaps the most significant impact of the Usner
decision is that it precludes the shipowner from becoming an absolute insurer
for the maritime worker. However, this is not to say that the injured seaman
or longshoreman is left without ample remedies by that decision. The shipowner is still bound to provide a ship, equipment, and crew reasonably fit
for their intended service. In addition, negligence actions under the Jones
Act 206 and compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act207 afford adequate means of redress without the synthesis
of the concepts of unseaworthiness and negligence. The expansion of the unseaworthiness doctrine has been criticized by a number of observers for its serious economic impact on the shipping industry. 208 The Usner decision, however,
should produce favorable economic results for the shipowner, since the concept of operational negligence may be a fairly adequate method of limiting
the shipowner's liability.
MARITIME JURISDIarION INVOLVING PIERSIDE INJURIES CAUSED BY

SHOREBASED EQUIpmENT
The conflict among the federal judicial circuits over the proper application of the principle of operational negligence has been somewhat rivaled
by the confict concerning the extent of the shipowner's duty for nonshipboard
injuries to longshoremen. The primary issue has involved the proper expansion of the warranty of seaworthiness in relation to a maritime worker injured
some distance away from the vessel by equipment not traditionally a part of
the ship's gear. More specifically, problems have arisen in ascertaining the
legal scope of loading and unloading in regard to the shipowner's duty to
gence which can not by clever advocacy and hair-line distinctions render the shipowner
liable for unseaworthiness," and that such a task results in a "futile effort to define catchwords which elude grasp." Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 864 F.2d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Kaufman, J., dissenting). Another judge has echoed the futility of making distasteful
distinctions unrelated to any intelligible concepts of right and wrong. Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539, 543, 544 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, C.J., dissenting). Concerning the requisite time factor involved, it has been suggested that practically no loading
or unloading operation could be carried on that required a separate timekeeper for every
man working in the gang. Candiano v.Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 F.2d 444, 446
(2d Cir. 1967).
205. As one commentator said: "It will be most difficult to explain to the seaman cut
by flying glass in Judge Hays' illustration [see note 137 supra] why he had no cause of
action for unseaworthiness but his buddy who stepped on the glass after it had fallen did."
H. BAER, ADMmALTY LAW oF THE SUPREmE COURT §§1-6 (1969). To the injured victim the
instantaneous act makes the vessel just as dangerous at it would if the defective condition
had preexisted a minute or an hour before the mishap. M. NoRms, MARITIME PERSONAL
INJURIEs §85 (1959).

206. 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970).
207. 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1970).
208. See Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1137, 1148-52 (1963); Comment, Expanding the Warranty
of Seaworthiness: Social Welfare or Marine Disaster, 9 VML.L. REv. 422, 439-40 (1964).
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the maritime worker and in formulating workable standards for determining
the beginning and termination of the loading and unloading process.
It is well-settled that the shipowner's warranty covers any person actually
in the service of the vessel. 209 The scope of this warranty extends to shipboard
accidents involving longshoremen caused by equipment of either the stevedore210 or the ship. 211 Although the warranty covers injuries occurring on
the dock by the ship's equipment or its defective cargo,2-12 uncertainty arose
when shorebased equipment caused injury to a longshoreman working on
the pier.
The doctrine's coverage depends primarily upon the nature of the work
being performed and its relationship to the vessel.2 13 Historically, the task
214
of loading and unloading has been considered work in the ship's service.
Thus, the warranty of seaworthiness extended to all persons taking part in
the loading process, since the longshoreman is doing a seaman's work and
25
incurring a seaman's hazard.
Expansion of Maritime Jurisdiction by Lower Federal Courts
With the advent of modern machinery and labor saving methods, the
traditional notion of loading and unloading has come into question. As a
result of judicial reexamination, the modern tendency among the federal
judiciary was to enlarge the concept, making it consistent with technological
advances in the shipping industry.
Total Operation Approach. Under the more expanded interpretation, one
was considered to be loading a vessel when he was taking direct, necessary
steps in the unbroken sequence of transferring cargo to and from the vessel,
intimately and essentially engaged in the total loading operation. 216 This
position was predicated upon the fact that the term loading "is not a word
of art, and is not to be narrowly and hypertechnically interpreted." 21 7 The
emphasis was on pragmatism rather than ritualism.
Illustrative of this approach was the Fifth Circuit's decision in Law v.
Victory Carriers, Inc. 218 There, the longshoreman was driving a forklift,
owned by the stevedoring company, on the dock. His work was to carry cargo

209. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 91 (1946).
210. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
211. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
212. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 213 (1963).
213. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
214. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). See also Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
215. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
216. Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), rer'd, 40 U.S.L.W.
4059 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971); McNeil v. A/S Hautor, 326 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Byrd
v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Litwinowicz
v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
217. Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
218. 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), revd, 40 U.S.L.W. 4059 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971).
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from a point about fifty yards from the vesssel to the hookup alongside the
vessel. Instead of taking these loads directly from the forklift onto the ship,
he would set them down to be subsequently taken aboard by other longshoremen using the ship's equipment. While the plaintiff was transporting one of
the loads, the overhead protection rack of the forklift came loose and fell
upon him, causing injury. He filed suit alleging unseaworthiness and negligence. The district court denied recovery and held for the shipowner.219
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the
longshoreman was engaged in loading the vessel and, therefore, was within
the scope of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. 220 The court reasoned that if
the warranty extends to the longshoreman who physically transfers the cargo
onto the vessel, then it should also extend to the longshoreman who moves the
cargo from one point on the dock toward the vessel. 221 "To deny him the
benefits of the doctrine of unseaworthiness," the court concluded, ..... would
222
be to reject the humanitarian policy that underlies the doctrine."
The longshoreman's activities were viewed by the court in light of the
total operation of loading the vessel.223 His task of moving the cargo from
the dock to the vessel's side was found to be "so integrally woven into the
entire loading operation that the [transfer and lifting onto the vessel] cannot
be separated except by erection of hypertechnical and unrealistic legal
224
barriers."
Several conditions must have been met before the longshoreman could
recover on a claim of unseaworthiness for injuries sustained some distance
from the vessel. First, and most important, the scope of the warranty must
have been found to encompass equipment that is neither part of the traditional
gear of the vessel nor attached to or touching the vessel itself. To limit the
warranty to traditional equipment only would, of necessity, restrict the definition of "loading" to its narrowest sense, the physical lifting of cargo onto the
ship.
While it is well-settled that the shipowner's warranty extends to equipment
supplied by the stevedoring company,225 the issue among the federal judiciary,
219. See Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), rer/d, 40 U.S.L.W.

4059 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion see text accompanying notes 249-262 infra.
220. Id. at 384, 385.

221. Id. at 384.
222. Id.
223. The same rules are applicable to both loading and unloading. Gebhard v. S.S.

Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970); United States Lines Co. v. King, 363
F.2d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 1966).
224. Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 40 U.S.L.W.
4059 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971).
225. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Rogers v. United States Lines,
347 U.S. 984 (1954). See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,
376 U.S. 315 (1964). Equipment must be part of the hull, gear, appliances, or appurtenances
of the ship in order to be within the subject matter of the seaworthiness doctrine. See
Mahnich v,Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). This includes all other equipment adopted
as appurtenances of the ship. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). See also Alaska S.S.
Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
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prior to the Supreme Court's determination in Victory Carrier, was whether
the warranty extended to shorebased equipment. 226 The Fifth Circuit 2 7 as
well as the Third 228 and Ninth Circuits, 2 29 adopted the expanded position,
finding the warranty to include defective shorebased loading equipment.
These courts emphasized the functional use of the equipment rather than its
2 31
traditional status 2 0 as a determinant of the warranty's coverage.
The second factor in determining liability of the shipowner was whether
the injury occurred while the longshoreman was taking "direct, necessary
steps in the physical transfer" of cargo to the vessel. 2 2 Direct and necessary
steps included the moving of cargo from a point on the pier to the vessel's
side 33 or merely moving it from one point to another point nearer the
vessel.2- Moreover, the condition could even be met by the more remote
aspects of the loading process. The shipowner's warranty, for example, covers
a worker loading a vehicle in a warehouse where the vehicle would then be
2
moved to the vessel's side. 35
The longshoreman's work must also have had continuity with the total
loading operation.236 In other words, it must have been an essential part of
226. E.g., Deffies v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 969 (1966); Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 1000
(1965); Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
943 (1964).
227. Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
969 (1966).
228. Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d "Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1000 (1965).
229. Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943
(1964). If the longshoreman was performing work in the service of the vessel, and if he
was injured as a result of a defect in equipment, whether on board or shorebased, the ship
was unseaworthy regardless of the relationship of the equipment to the ship. This equipment, which was unattached to the ship and standing on the pier, was considered to be
appurtenant to the ship as a necessary and integral part of the loading and unloading
process. See Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970). This view
appeared to follow the "type of work" test expressed in Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S.
406 (1953). See Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for
cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3029 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1971) (No. 70-64). The over-all result of the
majority view shifted the liability back to the stevedoring company through indemnity
suits and that company then has the incentive to improve its loading equipment. Gebhard
v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303, 1312 (9th Cir. 1970).
230. The Second and Sixth Circuits limited the warranty of seaworthiness to equipment traditionally a part of the hull, gear, stowage, appurtenant appliances, and equipment
of the vessel. The equipment must have been physically attached to the ship or touching
part of the ship during the loading or unloading process. Forken v. Furness Withy & Co.,
323 F.2d 638, 641 (2d Cir. 1963); McKnight v. N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd., 286 F.2d 250
(6th Cir. 1960).
231. Note, Unseaworthiness-Recovery by Longshoreman for Injuries Caused by Defective Shore-Based Equipment, 21 Sw. L.J. 381, 388 (1967).
232. Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
233. Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for cert.
filed, 40 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 7, 1971) (No. 70-64).
234. Byrd v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Pa.
1969).
235. Cf. Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963).
236. Cf. Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), ret'd, 40 U.S.L.W.
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an unbroken sequence of moving the cargo to the ship.23 7 If this sequence
were interrupted, the loading or unloading operation ceased. In Young v.
Chevron Oil Co. 238 the district court rejected the unseaworthiness claim where
the injury occurred approximately one hour after the cargo had been removed
from the ship and placed upon the pier. In that case, the plaintiff's work
was not sufficiently connected with the unloading of the vessel to make it part
of the seaman's work; thus, the actual loading had terminated.
239
Although spatial proximity to the vessel appeared to be a relevant factor,
no fixed or definite limits of proximity were set. Because this factor was
relative in nature, distance alone would not preclude recovery under an
unseaworthiness claim as long as the claimant's work was an essential part
of the loading process. 240 In Olvera v. Michalos241 the stevedore's employee
was injured while removing cargo from a railroad car alongside the warehouse,
about 200 yards from the vessel. The court allowed recovery and rejected the
shipowner's argument that the plaintiff's distance from the vessel precluded
the warranty from being applied.
Traditional Loading Approach. A minority of the lower federal courts
limited the concept of loading and unloading to those activities that begin
242
and end with the physical acts of lifting the cargo onto or off the vessel.
Recognizing that the liability of the shipowner is not unlimited, this view
attempted to find liability according to the more traditional and technical notions of the loading process.
The leading case utilizing this approach was Drumgold v. Plovba.2 43 Two
separate actions were involved in the case, one by a longshoreman who contended he was injured while loading a vessel, the other by a longshoreman
who contended he had been injured while unloading a vessel.
In the first action, the stevedoring company had been contracted to load
a ship. To prevent the shifting of the cargo at sea it was necessary to place
shifting boards in the ship's hold. The longshoreman was ordered by his
employer, the stevedore, to go ashore, load the truck with the boards, and
thereafter bring the truck onto the pier alongside the vessel so the boards

4059 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971).
287. Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for cert.
filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3029 (US. Jan. 7, 1971) (No. 70-64). The sequence of the operation may
be interrupted by the lapse of time, Young v. Chevron Oil Co., 314 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D.
La. 1970), or the delivery to a consignee, see Daniel v. Skibs A/S Hilda Knudson, 253 F.
Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 368 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 990 (1967).
238. 314 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. La. 1970).
239. Cf. Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), retld, 40 U.S.L.W.
4059 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971).
240. See Olvera v. Michalos, 307 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
241. Id.
242. Drumgold v. Plovba, 260 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Va. 1966); Daniel v. Skibs A/S Hilda
Knudson, 253 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 368 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 990 (1967). See also Partenweederei v. Weigel, 299 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 830 (1962).
243. 260 F. Supp. 983 (EfD. Va. 1966).
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could be placed aboard. The vessel's crane was to lift the boards from the
pier to the ship's dock. When the longshoreman attempted to put down the
truck's stabilizer and lift the load, the device proved defective causing the
truck to capsize and injure him.
The second action, with substantially similar facts, involved the unloading
of a vessel. There, the longshoreman was struck by the stevedore's allegedly
defective forklift while working on the dock alongside the vessel.
In both actions, the court acknowledged that the injured longshoreman
and the equipment were necessary adjuncts to completion of the loading and
unloading process. While recognizing that Gutierrez v. Waterman S. S.
Corp.2 44 extended the warranty of seaworthiness to longshoremen loading or

unloading a ship, whether aboard the ship or on the pier, the court denied
relief, finding that the loading operation in the first action had not commenced and that the unloading process in the second had terminated. 2 4 5 The

court opined that the doctrine of unseaworthiness should not be extended to
defective shorebased equipment as allowed by other court decisions.24 6
The rationale of this restricted approach was that while the longshoreman's work may technically be in the service of the ship, it was not loading
or unloading in the sense that it is part of the ship's work.2 47 This merely
placed a reasonable limitation upon the extent of the doctrine. 24 8
Supreme Court Rejection of the Total Operation Approach
249
The United States Supreme Court, deciding Victory Carriers,Inc. v. Law

on appeal from the Fifth Circuit, refused to expand maritime jurisdiction
landward and held that state law governs nonshipboard accidents involving
a longshoreman injured by defective shorebased equipment owned and
operated by his stevedore employer. Thus, the Court determined that a
maritime cause of action did not arise in this case, since the longshoreman
was injured by equipment not traditionally a part of the ship's gear and
because the accident did not occur aboard the vessel or on its gangplank.
In rejecting the Fifth Circuit's total operation approach, the Court
emphasized that maritime tort jurisdiction must be determined by the locality
of the accident rather than the function of the longshoreman's services. Noting
that nonshipboard accidents were not historically within maritime jurisdiction, the Court stated: "Piers and docks were consistently deemed extensions

244. 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
245. Drumgold v. Plovba, 260 F. Supp. 983, 987 (E.D. Va. 1966).
246. As the court noted: "We find no authority which would cause us to hold that
every piece of equipment and every activity leading up to or following the loading or the
unloading operation must be covered under the warranty of seaworthiness. We are concerned with the ship and the ship's equipment attendant to the ship's duty to load and
unload." Drumgold v. Plovba, 260 F. Supp. 983, 987 (E.D. Va. 1966) (court's emphasis).
See text accompanying notes 216-231 supra.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 40 U.S.L.W. 4069 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971), rev'g 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970). See
text accompanying notes 218-219 supra.
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of land; injuries inflicted to or on them were held not compensable under the
maritime law."' 250 Therefore, it was apparently unnecessary to define loading
2
and unloading as a requisite for determining maritime jurisdiction. 51
To refute the longshoreman's argument that the sole determinant of shipowner liability for unseaworthiness was the function of his services, the Court
distinguished Gutierrez,2 stating that an unseaworthiness cause of action
did not arise in that case because the longshoreman was unloading the vessel
at the time of injury, but rather because the injury was caused by the ship's
appurtenance, the defective cargo container.253 Alaska Steamship Co. v.
Petterson25 4 and Rogers v. United States Lines255 were also deemed inappli2
cable to the instant case, since both involved shipboard injuries. 56
In the delicate area of federal-state jurisdiction, the dividing line will
continue to be the ship's gangplank. 257 Dissatisfied earlier with this line,
Congress enacted the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, which expanded
maritime jurisdiction to include "all cases of damage or injury . . . caused
by a vessel on navigable waters, notwithstanding that such damage or injury
be done or consummated on land." 25s While this statute has been utilized as a
basis of recovery for a longshoreman's dockside injury resulting from a ship's
appurtenances, 259 it has never been interpreted to encompass a dockside
accident caused by the stevedore's shorebased equipment. 260 The Court thus
did not extend admiralty jurisdiction to the latter situation, leaving any
further jurisdictional expansion to Congress.
The approach adopted in Victory Carriers appears more amenable to the
maritime principle of uniformity. By restricting the outer limits of the shipowner's warranty to the gangplank, a workable standard can now be consistently and uniformly applied in determining liability for unseaworthiness.
Otherwise, it was conceivable and probable that the shipowner's warranty
could have been extended to an unlimited number of situations for which

250. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 40 U.S.L.W. 4059, at 4061 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971)

(footnote omitted).
251. The Court stated: "Reliance upon the gangplank line as the presumptive boundary
of admiralty jurisdiction, except for cases in which a ship's appurtenance causes damage
ashore, recognizes the traditional limitations of admiralty jurisdiction, and decreases the
arbitrariness and uncertainties surrounding amorphous definitions of 'loading."' Id. at 4063
n.14 (footnotes omitted). In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969), the
Supreme Court held that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
which covers injuries "upon the navigable waters," would not cover injuries on a pier
even though the pier extends over navigable waters.
252. The Court also found Sieracki inapplicable to the question of extension of maritime jurisdiction, because the accident there occurred on navigable waters. Victory Carriers,
Inc. v. Law, 40 U.S.L.W. 4059, at 4062 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971).
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
347 U.S. 396 (1954).
347 U.S. 984 (1954).
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 40 U.S.L.W. 4059, 5062 n.ll (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971).
Id. at 4061.
46 U.S.C. §740 (1970).
Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
Cf. Industrial Comm'n v. Nortenholt Co., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
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it was never intended. In dissent, however, Justice Douglas felt that if a
mechanical determination was desirable, a dividing line drawn around both
the ship and the dock would not only meet the objective of uniformity, but
would also be more compatible with the broad humanitarian policy for protection of longshoremen who are subject to all the risks and hazards of loading
and unloading ships. 21
Another consequence of the Victory Carriers decision is that the shipowner can minimize his burden of risk through the use of modern divisions
of labor. By contracting out the loading or unloading operation to a stevedoring company the shipowner can effectively shift his potential liability for
injuries sustained by those who perform services traditionally done by seamen.
The Victory Carriersdecision also creates a problem with respect to classification. Two longshoremen, although both loading or unloading a vessel,
may be treated differently. While a longshoreman injured on a pier by the
ship's defective equipment has a maritime cause of action for unseaworthiness, his cohort injured by shorebased equipment while performing similar
services on the same pier does not have a cause. The injured longshoreman's
available remedies are thus fortuitously determined.
It should be noted, however, that the latter longshoreman is not completely denied recovery, but he must resort to state workmen's compensation
laws. This is economically significant because his recovery is often limited to
an inadequate, predetermined amount from his stevedore-employer rather
than the jury-determined recovery from the shipowner under the doctrine of
262
unseaworthiness.
CONCLUSION

Wisely or not, the United States Supreme Court has in recent years generally been slow to articulate a determinative statement concerning the
proper scope of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Innovation and interpretation have been left primarily to the lower federal courts. However, with
uncommon breadth of statement, the Supreme Court has found a right of
action for wrongful death within the broad confines of unseaworthiness.
The manner in which this right will be implemented will no doubt be
the subject of numerous lower court decisions in the future. A well-defined
body of statutory, as well as nonstatutory, admiralty law will furnish guidance
in resolving these problems. Encompassed by federal admiralty law, the new
wrongful death action will probably incorporate principles of general maritime law in the determination of the limitation period, defenses, and damages, while the schedule of beneficiaries will most likely be patterned after
one of the federal maritime statutes. However these problems of implementation are resolved, they are merely collateral to the right created in Moragne.

261. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 40 U.S.L.W. 4059, 4066 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1971).
262. The significant aspect is the amount of recovery and not whether the shipowner
or stevedore-employer will be held liable. In an unseaworthiness action the shipowner will
merely shift his liability to the stevedore-employer through a third party action for indemnity. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc, v. Pin-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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Recently, the Supreme Court gave an indication of a limitation on the
doctrine of unseaworthiness in Usner. Although the Court laid the general
framework by its recognition of the shipowner's defense of operational negligence, the formulation of practical guidelines in distinguishing the actcondition dichotomy has been left to the lower federal judiciary.
These courts will no doubt draw upon earlier pronouncements in discerning the difference between the concepts of operational negligence and
unseaworthiness. Regardless of these future determinations, the Usner decision is of tremendous economic significance to the shipping industry. This
defense in maritime personal injury and wrongful death actions will preclude
the shipowner from being an absolute insurer of every accident.
Of late, an area of interpretative conflict among the federal judiciary
was resolved when the Supreme Court refused, in the absence of congressional
approval, to expand the boundaries of maritime law to include longshoremen
injured by shorebased equipment in nonshipboard accidents. In effect, the
doctrine of unseaworthiness was restricted to injuries sustained by longshoremen while working aboard ship or while working on the pier if the injuries
were caused by the ship's defective appurtenances. Although the Court recognized the inherent problems of classification and potentially inadequate
recoveries, it placed the burden on Congress to take corrective action through
appropriate legislation.
Before any congressional resolution concerning the scope of maritime
jurisdiction can be made, there must be an evaluation of the competing
policies - that is, broad protection of the longshoreman and reasonable
limitations on the shipowner's potential liability.
]KNOWLTON
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